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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JERRY V. STRAND,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
PRINCE-COVEY & CO., INC., and
ALMON COVEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13804

REPLY BRIEF
OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Defendant-appellant Prince-Covey & Co., Inc. submits this reply brief in response to certain new matters
raised in the brief of plaintiff-respondent Jerry Strand:
POINT I
ARTICLE 8 OF THE UTAH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE GOVERNS THIS CASE.
GENERAL RULES OF CONVERSION ARE
NOT APPLICABLE.
Plaintiff argues again in the Brief of Appellee as he
argued in the trial court that knowledge of adverse claims
1
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is immaterial in a conversion action (Brief of Appellee at
15-16). While this may be correct with respect to conversion of most goods, it is totally erroneous with respect to
conversion of negotiable securities.
Plaintiff does not once cite or consider Article 8 of
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code which governs transactions in negotiable securities, but presents for the Court's
consideration only general statements from Am. Jur. 2d
and a Utah case involving the conversion of seeds. General
rules of conversion are not applicable to the conversion of
negotiable securities; if they were, the securities would no
longer be negotiable, see Restatement (Second) of Torts
§233(4).
The pertinent sections of Article 8 are discussed at
some length in the Brief of Appellant, and defendant will
not belabor the point that they are applicable to and control the issues before this Court. It is sufficient to repeat
(1) that §70A-8-301(a) provides that a bona fide purchaser of a security "acquires {it} free of any adverse claims";
(2) that §70A-2-302 defines a bona fide purchaser as one
who, among other things, takes a security "without notice
of any adverse claim," and (3) that §70A-8-304(2) provides that "notice that the security is held for a third person" neither creates a duty of inquiry nor "constitute(s)
notice of adverse claims." The last section cited goes on to
require that the purchaser have ffknowledge that the proceeds are being used or that the transaction is for the individual benefit of the fiduciary or otherwise in breach of
duty," before he "is charged with notice of adverse
claims." (emphasis supplied).
2
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Plaintiff apparently does not wish the Court to consider the statutes governing his claim because they point
directly to its untenability. Almon Covey did not have
knowledge of plaintiff's claim to ownership of the stock
and knowledge cannot be imputed to him through Ted
England. From the record before the trial court, the only
conclusion consistent with Utah statutory law is that
Prince-Covey & Company, Inc. was a bona fide purchaser.
At best (for plaintiff), genuine issues as to defendant's
knowledge of plaintiff's purported ownership remain in
dispute and were not properly disposed of on the motion
for summary judgment.
POINT

II

DEFENDANT WAS EITHER A BONA FIDE
PURCHASER OR A BROKER-SELLER OF THE
STOCK CERTIFICATES IN QUESTION.
In his brief, plaintiff argues for the first time that
defendant was not a purchaser of the securities in question.
This is a reversal of the apparent position taken in his
complaint, in which he alleges that defendant was a purchaser:
"On September 13, 1972, the defendant Almon
Covey for himself and as agent of Prince-Covey
tendered to the lending institution the sums borrowed by Mr. England and in return therefore (sic)
received the common stock owned by the plaintiff.
Thereafter, contrary to the rights of plaintiff, the
defendants exercised ownership rights over the
common stock of Hoffman Resources, Inc., and,
upon information and belief, sold the same." Complaint, J8; App. A, Brief of Appellant at 32 (emphasis supplied).

3
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Defendant does not insist that he was a purchaser of
the securities, but only that he was either a purchaser
under the broad definition of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code or a broker who acted as agent for England
in selling the stock (the latter position being the one that
plaintiff apparently now espouses). For purposes of this
appeal, it is not terribly important which status is assigned
to defendant, since in either case there is a genuine issue
of material fact as to defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's
alleged ownership interest in the stock, which requires
reversal of the summary judgment.
A. The Utah Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.A.
§70A-1-201(33)) defines "purchaser" as "a person who
takes by purchase" and defines "purchase" as follows:
" 'Purchase' includes taking by sale, discount,
negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or reissue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property." §70A-1-201(32),
U.C.A.
If defendant had "dominion and control" of the securities
sufficient for plaintiff to state a cause of action in conversion, he had an "interest" in them within the definition of "purchase" set forth in the U.C.C. If it did not
have an "interest" that was "purchased" by the $4,000
delivered to Murray First Thrift, Mr. England alone must
have owned the interest, with no "dominion or control"
inhering in defendant. The claim for conversion would
then fall of its own weight, or alternatively must be supported by allegations of collusion and conspiracy between

%
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defendant Prince-Covey and England to convert the securities. N o such allegations or facts to support them exist
in the record.
Stated somewhat differently, the assertion of "dominion and control over . . . goods inconsistent with the
owner's rights" (Alfred v. Hinkley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 76, 328
P.2d 726 (1958)) which is necessary to state a claim in conversion must include an assertion of the converter's interest in the goods. This interest itself may be a proprietary
interest, pursuant to which the converter uses the goods
or sells them as his own to a third party, or a pecuniary
interest by which he asserts a right to the proceeds of the
sale. In either event, and particularly in this case, the
concept of Prince-Covey's "interest in" the securities cannot be separated from its alleged status as a converter.
Whether the interest — the dominion or control — which
Prince-Covey asserted was justified in fact and in law is
the entire subject of this action.
Since defendant is a purchaser of the stock, the question posed is whether it is a bona fide purchaser under
U.C.A. §§70A-8-301 and 302 and thus immune from plaintiff's adverse claim. The answer to that issue depends on
the factual determination of whether defendant acted in
good faith and without notice of adverse claims — questions of material fact which were improperly resolved in
the court below and which thus require reversal as elaborated in appellant's brief.
B. Plaintiff asserts in his brief that defendant must
be treated as a broker that sold the stock in question. If
that is the case, then U.C.A. §70A-8-318 applies:
5
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"Ail agent or bailee who in good faith (including
observance of reasonable commercial standards if
he is in the business of buying, selling, or otherwise dealing with securities) has received securities
and sold, pledged, or delivered them according to
the instructions of his principal is not liable for
conversion or for participation in breach of fiduciary duty although the principal had no right to dispose of them."

Under this section, the main question is whether the defendant, acting as selling agent for England, acted "in
good faith" in selling the stock. If he did, then he cannot
be liable as a converter. ?
According to the U.C.C., "good faith" means "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."
U.C.A. §70A-1-201(19) (emphasis added). Whether defendant exercised good faith when the instruments in
question gave no indication on their face of any adverse
interest is certainly a question of fact that could not be
resolved from the record before the court below. See
Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co. v. Walston & Co., 21
N.Y.2d 219, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58, 234 N.E.2d 230 (1967);
State Bank of Binghampton v. Bache, 162 Misc. 178, 293
N.Y.S. 667 (1937). It should be noted that §70A-8-318 requires only good faith, whereas §70A-8-302 (defining
bona fide purchaser) requires both good faith and lack
of notice of adverse claims. By negative inference, then,
under §70A-8-318, notice of an adverse claim, even as
defined in §70A-8-304(2), may not defeat the protection
afforded securities brokers who act in good faith. But in
any case, the question of good faith presents a material
%
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factual issue, and the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment without resolving that issue.
POINT

III

TED ENGLAND'S KNOWLEDGE OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP CANNOT
BE IMPUTED T O DEFENDANT.
A principal issue in this case is whether defendant
had knowledge of plaintiff's alleged ownership interest in
the stock, and whether Ted England's knowledge should
be imputed to defendant as a matter of law. If defendant
had no knowledge of plaintiff's ownership claim, then it
qualifies either as a bona fide purchaser under U.C.A.
§70A-8-301, or as a broker acting in good faith under
U.C.A. §70A-8-318, thus precluding liability for conversion of the stock.
In the Brief of Appellant, defendant argued at length
that Ted England's knowledge cannot be imputed to
Prince-Covey because their positions were adverse in this
transaction [Brief of Appellant at 8-18}. This argument is
based on rules of agency law that have been announced
in Utah and embodied in §279, Restatement (Second) of
Agency. In response to this, plaintiff argues in effect that
because Mr. England and Mr. Covey were in each other's
company when the stock was obtained from Murray First
Thrift and sold, there existed a "joint" and "mutual" interest between them that encompasses the entire relationship and transaction (Brief of Appellee at 8-9). Because
of plaintiff's unusual notions of what constitutes adverse
positions, a brief recapitulation of the relationship between Prince-Covey and England seems appropriate.

#
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First, the two were in the position of creditor-debtor.
These positions must be considered adverse; if they are
not, a creditor's suit against his debtor would be dismissed
for failure to state an adverse claim. It was this adverse
creditor-debtor relationship which induced England to
pay defendant the proceeds derived from the sale of the
stock. The phrase "adverse party" as used in §279 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency must mean that a claim
or demand exists or may arise between the principal and
agent that is cognizable in an adversary legal action. Such
a claim is present in all the cases cited by defendant in its
brief, and is obviously present in this case.
Plaintiff implies that Prince-Covey and England had
a "joint" or "mutual" interest in having the debt extinguished. This is analogous to arguing that plaintiff and
defendant in this action have a joint and mutual interest
in having the claim resolved by a final order of the court.
Such mutual interests are irrelevant to whether the adverse claim between them defines them as adverse parties.
Secondly, it is uncontroverted that England never
informed Mr. Covey of plaintiff's purported ownership
interest in the stock. It was necessary that England conceal whatever knowledge he had of such ownership interests to serve his own personal interests, i.e., to extinguish
his debt and to preserve the stock from defendant's execution on it. 1 In the course of such concealment, he estab1
It should be remembered that plaintiff owes defendant PrinceCovey $34,696.16 from a prior lawsuit based upon plaintiffs failure to pay for securities he ordered purchased for his account. Had defendant known of plaintiff's claimed ownership it would have levied upon
the stock to satisfy this prior judgment.

®
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lished yet another "adverse position" with defendant; for
defendant potentially has a claim against England based
on the numerous breaches of duty inherent in his deceit.
Plaintiff in his brief asserts that England and defendant "divided" the proceeds of the sale of the stock (Brief
of Appellee at 9). This is a distortion of the facts. Defendant and England did not "divide the proceeds"; rather,
the proceeds were used to reduce England's indebtedness
to defendant. Defendant clearly gave value for the portion
of the proceeds of the stock which it received.
On the issue of imputation of knowledge, plaintiffappellee sets out several sections from the Restatement
(Second) of Agency, none of which are applicable in this
case. The sections cited by plaintiff do not apply where,
as in this case, the agent (England) and the principal (defendant) were acting as adverse parties, and where the
agent was not acting as an agent in any manner in the
transaction in question.
Section 271 of Restatement (Second) of Agency, on
which plaintiff relies to establish defendant's "notice" of
his claim, defines situations where a principal or a third
party will be bound by notification to or from the principal's agent when the agent is acting in his own interest,
but is apparently acting for his principal. The comments
and illustrations to this section make clear that the rule
of this section applies only when notification is to the
agent as an agent. Consider, for example, Example 4 to
Comment (a):
"Before tearing down a building adjoining
T's building, T sends to P's apparently authorized
#
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agent, A, a letter telling what he plans to do. A,
hoping harm will come to P, does nothing. T has
satisfied any requirement of notifying adjoining
owners."

Furthermore, the instant case does not involve "notification" in any sense. Nothing is alleged either in the complaint or anywhere else that would reasonably imply that
plaintiff gave some notification to England which would
bind the principal defendant. Rather, plaintiff is attempting to impute England's knowledge to Prince-Covey in
circumstances where their interests were adverse, c.f.,
Comment (d), Restatement (Second) of Agency, §282.
Section 274, Restatement (Second) of Agency, by its
terms, applies only where the agent, in his capacity as
acting agent, acquires property for the principal. The comments to this section, and the case law which it embodies,
make clear that it is primarily a rule of restitution. Comment (b) provides in part:
"The rule stated in this Section is not primarily a rule of agency, but of restitution. The
prima facie liability of the principal exists because
of unjust enrichment. If the property is obtained
by conduct for which the principal is not responsible, he is protected by a change of position. On the
other hand, if the agent is guilty of tortious conduct
for which the principal was responsible, a change
of position is no defense."
In support of his position, plaintiff quotes Comment
(c) to §274 incompletely, omitting the last half of the sentence which gives meaning to the statement:

10
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"Where an agent, having no power to bind the
principal by the transaction, acquires property
from a third person by fraud and, without the
principal's knowledge, transfers it to the principal to make up for past or future embezzlements,
the principal takes it subject to a constructive trust,
since he is enriched to the extent of the value of
the property thus transferred and has given nothing in exchange/' (emphasis supplied).
In this case, there is no allegation of embezzlement and
defendant gave value in exchange for the stock or its proceeds by extinguishing England's debt.
Consider also Comment (d);
"The rule stated in this Section does not apply
where the agent obtains property on his own account and subsequently, as a vendor, transfers it to
his principal. In such cases, the agent is not acting
as agent in the transaction, and, therefore, the
principal may be a bona fide purchaser; if he is,
he is not required to surrender the subject matter.
See §279" (emphasis supplied).
In summary, the rule stated in §274 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency covers situations and defines
responsibilities where an agent has improperly obtained
property from a third person and used it for his principal's
benefit without the principal's knowledge, and the principal has given nothing of value, nor changed his position
in reliance upon the benefit conferred. These are simply
not the circumstances of this case, for which the comments
to §274 direct attention to §279.
s
11
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Plaintiff also asserts that the rule of Restatement
(Second) of Agency, §282, is applicable to this case,
emphasizing subsection (2)(c). The comment to this subsection states:
i

"(h). . . . If the principal receives a benefit as
the result of the conduct of an agent, he cannot
keep the benefit and escape responsibility for the
means by which it has been acquired, unless he
takes as a bona fide purchaser, (see Comment (j))
or unless there is otherwise a change in his position
(see Comment (k))" (emphasis supplied).
Comment (j) is on all fours with the instant case and
states explicitly that §279 governs bona fide purchaser
issues.
"(j). Principal as Bona Fide Purchaser. If the principal obtains title to property because of the independent fraud of his agent, he may still be a bona
fide purchaser if, without knowledge of the fraud,
he pays value to the agent or to another. Thus, as
stated in §279, if he deals with the agent as an adverse party and receives as a purchaser property
which the agent had obtained by fraud, he may
keep it. So, if an agent having embezzled from his
principal has replaced the embezzled funds with
others which he has stolen, the principal is protected if, with or without knowledge of the embezzlement, he settles accounts with the agent."
Comment (m) further explains the relationship be£
r
tween §§279 and 282.
"The rule stated in this Section is to be contrasted
with the rule stated in §279, which states the rule
which is applicable when the agent is dealing with

m
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the principal. In that situation, the agent is not
only acting adversely to the principal but is known
by the parties to be acting as an adversary party;
the agent's knowledge with reference to the transaction no more affects the principal than the
knowledge of any third person, whereas under the
circumstances dealt with in this Section, the agent
is acting or purporting to act for the principal,
and the latter is bound by his knowledge under
any of the circumstances stated in subsection (2).
Plaintiff's reliance on §282 is unfounded. The issue
before the trial court and this Court was and is whether
defendant's status as a bona fide purchaser can be defeated by the imputation of Ted England's knowledge to
it. The trial court's imputation of England's knowledge
ignores the rule summarized in §279 of Restatement (Second) of Agency from decisions of this Court and most
other jurisdictions. The very sections of the Restatement
on which plaintiff relies point to the rule of §279 as
governing this case.
Plaintiff also cites §§235 and 236 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency. These sections deal with whether an
agent is acting within the scope of employment. Section
235 provides:
"An act of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of which he is employed."
It is puzzling that plaintiff would cite this action since it
directly supports defendant's position that England was
not acting within the scope of his employment in the

13
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transaction that is the subject matter of this case. By no
reasonable stretch of the imagination can it be argued that
England's transfer to defendant of the proceeds from the
sale of the stock in question was within the scope of his
employment as an account broker employed by defendant.
Section 236 states the obvious principle that:
1

"Conduct may be within the scope of employment,
although done in part to serve the purposes of the
servant, or of a third person."

This is certainly not to say that conduct is always within
the scope of employment when done to serve the purposes
of the servant or of a third person, as plaintiff would
apparently have the Court believe. Clearly, conduct may
also be outside the scope of employment, although done
to serve the agent's interest, and that is often the case.
Plaintiff's reliance on the cases cited in his brief is
misplaced. These cases involve either an agent acting as
an agent or enunciate general principles of conversion
that do not apply to the conversion of negotiable securities.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts, §233(4).
In Barsh v. Mullins, 338 P.2d 845 (Okla. 1959), by
plaintiff's own description of the case, the agent was acting
as agent "in the performance of a duty that (the principal}
had given him the authority to perform." Contrary to
plaintiff's assertion, it was the dissent in that case, not the
majority, that relied upon §282 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.
• : • •
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Plaintiff cites two cases, Moses v. Archie McFarland
& Son, 119 Utah 602, 230 P.2d 571 (1951), and Thirteenth
and Washington Street Corp. v. Nelson, 123 Utah 70, 254
P.2d 847 (1953), in support of his argument that defendant ratified the acts of England's conversion by accepting
the benefits of the sale of stock. Each of these cases involves situations where the agent was acting as agent, in
contrast to the case a hand. Furthermore, the principles
of ratification enunciated in them do not apply to circumstances involving a bona fide purchaser or brokerseller of negotiable securities.
In Malta v. Giles, 100 Utah 562, 114 P.2d 208 (1941),
the statute in force at that time required that the owner
endorse stock for transfer or that written authority of the
agent must accompany a certificate. In that case, neither
of those elements were present, and the court held that
such absence "is a warning to others to deal at arms
length" 114 P.2d at 211. The case is clearly inapplicable
because under present statutes there are no such requirements for the transfer of stock in bearer form.
In Latsis v. Nick Floor, 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619
(1940), it was held that where an agent entered into a
lease agreement with the third party and the third party
made valuable and permanent improvements on the property, the principal may not accept the benefits of that
performance and deny the liabilities, provided that the
principal has knowledge of such benefits. Once again this
case deals with an agent dealing with a third party as an
agent of the principal and has no application to this case,
where England was not acting as defendant's agent. More15
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over the rules regarding ratification of contracts are inapplicable to bona fide purchasers of negotiable securities,
which must be governed by Article 8 of the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code.
.
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As pointed out in defendant-appellant's brief, Allred
v. Hinkley, supra, correctly states the general law of conversion. However, as explained in defendant's brief (Brief
of Appellant at 8-18), those rules do not apply with respect to a bona fide purchaser of negotiable securities.
Where negotiable securities are involved, the Utah Uniform Commercial Code controls, and a bona fide purchaser or a broker who sells in good faith is protected
against an adverse claim sounding in conversion. See
U.C.A. §§70A-9-301(2) and 70A-8-318.
POINT

IV

THE DEPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF STRAND
DOES N O T DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP
A N D DATE-OF-NOTICE ISSUES.
The deposition of plaintiff Strand was not a part of
the record before this Court when appellant's brief was
prepared. Defendant does concede, however, that, in view
of absence of affidavits or other evidence controverting
plaintiff's depositional testimony, the trial court at the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, if it considered the deposition at all, was left with the choice of
accepting or doubting the statements therein only on the
basis of the inherent credibility of the deposition itself.
The portions of it quoted in the Brief of Appellee are
average examples of the directness of plaintiff's answers
16
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and the general probative value of the information elicited
from him. The problems with Strand's status as pledgor
of the stock, and the consequent issue of his right to immediate possession discussed in the Brief of Appellant at
21-22, are never clearly explained. On the one hand, Mr.
Strand testifies that England was constantly indebted to
him; on the other, that stock with a value of $12,000 to
$15,000 was pledged by him to England in consideration
of a debt of $1,500 that he owed England. (Deposition of
Jerry Strand at 4-6 and 11-13.) Nevertheless, the ownership and conversion-date issues set out in the Brief of
Appellant at 18-25 were not strongly urged at the hearing
for summary judgment, and it would be unreasonable
to expect a trial court to give a deposition the attention
that would reveal the infirmities that defendant maintains
inhere in Strand's testimony. The deposition is now in
the record. Defendant respectfully submits that it deserves
the consideration of this appellate Court to determine its
value for establishing the facts which plaintiff claims it
proves.2

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this reply brief and the Brief
of Appellant, plaintiff's contentions that defendant was
not a bona fide purchaser are without foundation and
2
Internal contradictions and infirmities in testimony may of course
always be considered by the trier of faa. This Court has stated that it
will review the record on appeal from summary judgment in the light
most favorable to the party against whom judgment is entered. Gammon
v. Federated Milk Producers Asfn, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 421, 360 P.2d 1018
(1961).
.,..
u
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genuine issues of material fact remained in dispute when
the trial court entered its summary judgment. The judgment should accordingly be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD,
MILLER & GELDZAHLER
Frederick S. Prince, Jr., Esq.
Michael F. Heyrend, Esq.
J. Rand Hirschi, Esq.
455 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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